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Risk before Justice:When the LawContests
Its Own Suspension
LOUISE AMOORE∗
Abstract
Contemporary securitypracticespose aparticularparadox in the relationshipbetween lawand
norm. On the one hand, the institution of risk practices in advance of, and in place of, juridical
decisions appears to have become the technical resolution of choice to the politics of targeted
security in the ‘war on terror’. The risk calculus makes possible an array of interventions –
from detention, deportation, or ‘secondary’ security to asset freezing and ‘blacklisting’ – that
operate in place of, and in advance of, the legal thresholds of evidence and decision. And yet,
this article demonstrates, it is not the case that law recedes as risk advances, but rather that law
potentially both authorizes and contests speciﬁc modes of risk management. As risk practices
in the war on terror operate on and through a distinctive and novel terrain of the uncertain
future, the capacityof juridical intervention to contest the exposureofpeople todehumanizing
technologies itself faces new potentials and limits.
Keywords
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The instruments of government will become diverse tactics rather than laws. Con-
sequently, law recedes.1
Instead of beginning with very speciﬁc rigid, legalistic rules, we ought to begin with
shared principles. Sharing identity information will help us better understand who
actually poses a risk and should receive more targeted security. Our risk management
philosophy drives all that we do.2
1. INTRODUCTION: ‘POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS PEOPLE’
In May 2007, the US Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, addressed
the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs.
Amidst widespread European disquiet as to the deployment by US authorities of
passenger name record (PNR) data for the pre-emptive risk scoring of air passengers
∗ Louise Amoore is Reader in Political Geography, Department of Geography, University of Durham. She leads
the ‘Contested Borders’ and ‘Data Wars’ projects, funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council
(ESRC).
1 M. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Colle`ge de France 1977–1978, trans. G. Burchell (2007),
99.
2 M. Chertoff, ‘Remarks to European Parliament’s Committee on Justice, Civil Liberties and Home
Affairs’, US Department of Homeland Security, 15 May 2007, available at www.dhs.gov/xnews/
speeches/sp_1180627041914.sthm.
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entering theUnited States, Chertoff sought to place emphasis not on the question of
the juridical grounds of the transnational extradition of data on European citizens,
but on the establishment of norms and practices of risk management.3 Indeed,
during his visit to Europe, Chertoff was reported to have proffered a somewhat
stark choice to the British government, between on the one hand the authorization
of norms of data mining for the risk management of air passengers and on the
other the withdrawal of the legal entitlement to visa waiver from some British
citizens.FollowingtheapparentfoilingofatransatlanticaircraftbombplotinAugust
2006, Chertoff discussed with the UK Home Ofﬁce the intention to withdraw the
right of visa waiver from ‘British citizens of Pakistani origin’ – categorizing British
citizenship into degrees of risk, singling out those ‘potentially dangerous people’ to
whom ‘we should pay greater attention’.4
The alternative to what would be, in effect, the drawing of a legal exception to
the exception of visa waiver, has emerged in the form of an apparently extra-legal
administrative complex of fused public and private data mining. ‘We use this data’,
argues Chertoff, ‘to focus on behaviour, not race and ethnicity. In fact, it allows us to
move beyond crude proﬁling based on prejudice, and to look at actual conduct.’5 Of
course, arguably a risk-based system that is ‘not racial proﬁling’ but that classiﬁes
past travel or remittances to Pakistan and speciﬁc name algorithms, among many
other associations as identiﬁers of ‘potentially dangerous people’, is precisely the
withdrawal of the right to visa waiver by other means.
The deal struck between the US and UK governments, to accept ‘screening at
their end, sharing intelligence with the Americans’ and ‘deporting Britons who
failed screening once they arrived at an airport in the US’, leaves the mask of the
legal category of visa waiver in place, while allowing the use of risk norms and
categories to proliferate.6 It is this institution of risk practices in advance of, and
in place of, juridical decision that has become the technical resolution of choice to
the politics of targeted security in the war on terror. At the time of writing, new
memoranda of understanding governing the terms of the granting ofUS visawaiver
to European citizens are being signed. One might say that, once instituted, such
measures surpass and supersede all political and juridical debates on PNR or data
3 InMay 2006 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that ‘the CommissionDecision of 14May 2004 on the
adequate protection of personal data contained in the PassengerNameRecord of air passengers transferred to
theUSBureauofCustomsandBorder Protectionbe annulled’ (Case 318/04,EuropeanParliament v. Commission
of the EuropeanCommunities), and that ‘theCouncil decisionof 17May2004on the conclusionof anagreement
between the European Community and the United States on the transfer and processing of PNR data be
annulled’ (Case C-317/04, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union). The Parliament had sought to
challenge the extradition of personal data on European citizens under Art. 8 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR): ‘everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right, except such as is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security.’ The ECJ did not uphold the infringement of Art. 8, basing its judgment instead on the
inadequate legal basis in the European Treaty.
4 M. Chertoff, ‘US Seeks Closing of Visa Loophole for Britons’,New York Times, 2 May 2007, 5.
5 M. Chertoff, ‘Remarks by Secretary Michael Chertoff to the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies’, 3 May 2007, available at www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/
sp_1178288606838.shtm (last visitedMay 2007).
6 Ibid.
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mining of many kinds. The text of the agreements reveals the legal authorizations
required inorder for apparently extra-legal practices andprocedures tobe instituted:
‘section 711 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007 reforms the visa waiver program, expanding opportunities for participation
in the program subject to certain enhanced security requirements’.7 Such enhanced
security measures are outlined as ‘information exchange, screening information to
combat terrorism and serious crime, general information on migration matters’,
and ‘allowing for further dissemination of transferred information within the US
Government’. The screening and risk scoring of information ‘in advance of travel’,
limitless at least insofar as ‘the US Secretary of Homeland Security deems it ne-
cessary’, will determine the ‘eligibility of a citizen to travel to the US without a
visa’ or ‘whether the citizen poses a law enforcement or security risk’.8 In sum, the
juridical designation of exceptions to the visa waiver clears space for multiple and
proliferating riskpractices that defer sovereigndecisions–oncitizenship, eligibility,
deportation, and so on – into a discretionary complex.
The controversy of European extradition of data to the United States – as well as
its subsequent ebbing away into apparently extra-legal, even apolitical, procedures
(‘this is not proﬁling’; ‘private companies handle your data this way every day’, and
so on) – is but one glimpse of a broader set of difﬁculties in how we have come to
understand the relationship between law and norm. For, as law becomes ever more
closely intertwined with a proliferating assemblage of expertise, risk consulting,
administration, and discretion, it inhabits an inescapable paradox. On the one hand,
law represents established rules, rights, and judgments – the ‘rule of law’, ‘which
rests absolutelywitheveryvalid legislativeactandconsists in theproductionof legal
effects’.9 For many legal activists, as for civil liberties and human rights lawyers, it
is precisely the defence of this rule of law that is most at stake in the challenging of
apparent ‘suspensions’ such as those in the US Patriot Act. As lawyer and director of
the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) Marc Rotenberg put it, ‘the EPIC
juridical programme is inmanyways not radical at all, but profoundly conservative.
At least to the extent that it seeks to protect lawmade in Congress some thirty years
ago.’10 In this sense one might suggest, even if superﬁcially, that law is engaged in
the contestation of ‘counter laws’ that represent its own suspension.11 And yet it
is precisely law and juridical designation that make possible the authorization of
judgments by other means that appear to us as extra-legal: a risk classiﬁcation that
revokes the rights of a citizen, an algorithmic judgement that places a person on
a ‘selectee list’ for secondary security checks. Understood this way, it is not strictly
the case that, as Foucault says, ‘law recedes’, but that ‘acts that do not have the
7 Department of Homeland Security, ‘Memorandum of understanding regarding the US VisaWaiver Program
and enhanced security measures’ (2008).
8 Ibid., at 3.
9 G. Agamben, State of Exception (2005), 37.
10 Interview with Marc Rotenberg, director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center and senior counsel,
Washington, DC, 30 October 2007. Rotenberg has testiﬁed worldwide on the effects of national security
exemptions to laws governing privacy, surveillance, and the use of electronic data. He testiﬁed before the
9/11 Commission on ‘Security and Liberty: Protecting Privacy, Preventing Terrorism’.
11 R. Ericson, Crime in an InsecureWorld (2007), 24.
850 LOUISE AMOORE
value of law acquire its force’.12 Thus, as in the ﬂoating suspension of visa waiver in
favourofpre-emptive risk screening, the legal categoryof citizen isbrokendownand
denuded, replaced with dissected degrees of recognition that are dependent upon
‘risk’, ‘conduct’, or ‘past patterns of travel’. It is not the case that ‘law recedes’ as risk
advances, but rather that law itself authorizes a speciﬁc and particular mode of risk
management.
As a consequence of the particular modern entanglement of law and norm, the
legalcontestationof riskmeasures institutedasdiscretionaryadministrativeauthor-
ity faces a quite speciﬁc set of problematics. Understood as a technique of governing,
risk isuncertaintymadecertain. That is to say, it acts on theuncertain future inaway
that undercuts law’s conventional reliance on precedent, evidence, and judgement
in the present. Risk technologies, as they have emerged in the contemporarywar on
terror, favour instead the rendering of pre-emptive decisions that do not calculate
probability on the basis of past evidence, but rather on the horizon of what may
happen in the future.13 The risk calculus, then, has distinct and speciﬁc implications
for international law, making possible an array of interventions – from detention,
deportation, or ‘secondary’ security to asset freezing and ‘blacklisting’ – that operate
in place of, and in advance of, the legal thresholds of evidence and decision.14
In the sections that follow, I begin bymapping the contours of the contemporary
risk–norm–lawcomplex, thenmove toexplore themeansbywhich speciﬁc contem-
poraryriskpracticesundercutthegroundsforhistorical legal intervention:evidence,
the judgement of the expert witness, and the legal subject as bearer of rights are all
reoriented in a risk regime that acts pre-emptively and authorizes with indeﬁnite
and indeterminate limits. It is my argument that the law, as it becomes inextricably
bound up with novel administrative and discretionary risk practices, is confronted
with something of the contingency and fragility of its own essence, its own essential
categories. To be clear, it is not the case that the scope for critical international legal
intervention is entirely eradicated. After all, there can be little doubt that it is often
by means of law and legal intervention that the normalization of risk practices is
brought to public attention and made extraordinary. Indeed, in the absence of the
legal challenges to practices of pre-emptive data mining, many of which actually
revealed previously concealed security practices, would there be space for public
engagement with the use of risk techniques in the war on terror? In the process of
contesting thegrowingubiquityof riskproﬁling, scoring, and screening, though, the
law must confront its own paradox. As Mariana Valverde and Nikolas Rose suggest
in their powerful genealogy of law and norm, ‘the codes, instruments and practices
of law have functioned to extend the powers of administration over life in the name
of reason’, and yet at the same time, ‘the discourse of rights and legality have been
deployed as a principal critique of the extension of such rationalized powers over
12 Agamben, supra note 9, at 38.
13 See L. Amoore and M. de Goede, ‘Transactions after 9/11: The Banal Face of the Preemptive Strike’,
(2008) 33(2) Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 173; R. Van Munster, ‘The War on Terro-
rism: When the Exception Becomes the Rule’, (2004) 17 International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 141;
B. Massumi, ‘Potential Politics and the Primacy of Preemption’, (2007) 10(2) Theory & Event, available at
http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2massumi.html.
14 O. Kessler andW.Werner, ‘Extrajudicial Killing as RiskManagement’, (2008) 39 Security Dialogue 289.
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life’.15 As risk practices in thewar on terror operate on and through a distinctive and
novel terrainof theuncertain future, the capacity of juridical intervention to contest
the exposureof people todehumanizing technologies itself facesnewpotentials and
limits.
2. RISK, NORM, AND LAW
As a means of making an uncertain and unpredictable world appear amenable to
management, the idea of risk has historically had a close and complex relationship
withtheprinciplesandpracticesoflaw.Thus, forexample, theearlymodernpractices
of life insurance – placing a wager on the merchant voyager’s risk of death – were
transformed into the rational calculations of actuarial practice by legal judgments
and prohibitions on gambling on life.16 Similarly, the nineteenth-century risks of
workaccident, sickness,or fatalitywererenderedmanageablebythejuridicaldevices
of labour law, insurance, and beneﬁt.17 Understood in these terms, both risk and
law have come to be ways of governing human life via calculation, judgment, and
decision,asthoughtheveryunknowabilityanduncertaintyofthefutureworldcould
be brought into the purview ofmanageability in the present. As for Franc¸ois Ewald,
‘a technology of risk is a means of disassembling, reconstructing, and organizing
certain elements of reality’.18 Risk, then, is a ‘manufactured uncertainty’, a way
in which ‘we govern and are governed’.19 It is a promise that we may ‘confront
the world of lived experience (and all of its terrors), with the more neutral and
predictable world of risk’.20
In the context of post-9/11 worlds, however, the historical fungibility and con-
tingency of risk, and its relation to law, have somewhat fallen away from analyses
of the world and our place within it. In Ulrich Beck’s reading, for example, the
‘world risk society’ reaches its limit when science and law can no longer respond to
the proliferation of ‘potentially catastrophic and uninsurable events’.21 For Richard
Ericson and Aaron Doyle, a similar risk limit is reached in a ‘terrorism that strikes
at the heart of risk society’, rendering past ways of taming chance and uncertainty
impossible, and presenting ‘a stark reminder of the limits to risk assessment and
management’.22 Andyet it isnot the case that risk societyhas reached its limits at the
threshold of a world depicted in terms of catastrophe (whether terrorism, climate
15 M. Valverde and N. Rose, ‘Governed by Law?’, (1998) 7 Social and Legal Studies 541, at 543.
16 See L. Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment (1988); G. Clark, Betting on Lives: The Culture of Life
Insurance in England (1999).
17 F. Ewald, ‘Insurance and Risk’, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in
Governmentality (1991).
18 F. Ewald, ‘Norms, Discipline, and the Law’, (1990) 30 Representations 138, at 142.
19 B. Adam and J. van Loon, ‘Introduction’, in B. Adam and J. van Loon (eds.), The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical
Issues for Social Theory (2000), 2 ; P. O’Malley, ‘Introduction: Conﬁgurations of Risk’, (2000) 29 Economy and
Society 457, at 458.
20 Ewald, supra note 18, at 142.
21 U. Beck, World Risk Society (1999), 4. See also U. Beck, ‘Risk Society Revisited: Theory, Politics and Research
Programmes’, in B. Adam, U. Beck, and J. van Loon (eds.), The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social
Theory (2000).
22 R. Ericson and A. Doyle, ‘Catastrophe Risk, Insurance and Terrorism’, (2004) 33 (2) Economy and Society 135,
at 141.
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change, landslide, or ﬂooding), but rather that risk is precisely a technology of
limits – a means of pushing at what is possible. Because, as Ewald says, ‘there is no
risk in reality’, then risk exists only as a ‘waywe have come to understand theworld
and its problems’.23 To deﬁne a world that is ‘post-9/11’ or characterized by the ‘war
on terror’, then, is not to reach the limits of risk at all, but to come to understand
theworld deployingnovel risk technologieswithnewand startling implications for
law.24
In the incorporation of risk management into contemporary security practice,
the sheer unpredictability or incalculability of terrorist attack has not led, then, to
the placing of limits on risk. On the contrary, it has made radical uncertainty the
very basis for action via risk calculations. Thus, for example, Ron Suskind’s account
of the post-9/11 Bush administration’s ‘one per cent doctrine’ positions the risk of
catastrophe as the essence of a security decision: ‘if there is a one per cent chance of
an event coming due, act as though itwere a certainty’.25 In effect, the precautionary
principle is brought into security practice, ‘inviting one to anticipate what one does
not know’ and making decisions ‘not in a context of certainty, nor even available
knowledge, but of doubt, premonition, foreboding, fear and anxiety’.26 In contrast
to risk models that seek to prevent or to predict, then, those dominating security
domains are pre-emptive – they function precisely by allowing movement, permit-
ting life to play out. In his identiﬁcation of risk as central to the security apparatus,
Michel Foucault describes ‘the emergence of a completely different problem’ that
orientates itself to ‘allowing circulations to take place, controlling them, sifting
the good and the bad, ensuring things are always in movement’.27 Integral to the
idea of risk is the always already present possibility to govern on the very basis of
uncertainty – via ‘differential risks’, ‘risk zones’, ‘different curves of normality’.28
Just as the designation of emergency or exception does not suspend the deploy-
ment of risk as ameans of governing, so the space of exceptiondepicted byAgamben
is not as ‘empty’, ‘anomic’, or ‘kenomatic’ as he suggests.29 As Fleur Johns has argued
in relation to Guanta´namo Bay, although the security measures and violence may
‘imply an extra-legal status’, in fact the detainees held there have ‘been the focus
of painstaking work of legal classiﬁcation’.30 Far from a designation of exception
that suspends international law, we see a space that teems with the classiﬁcations,
categories, and judgements of ‘petty sovereigns’ or ‘experts inunease’,whose actions
are authorized in and through law itself.31 The ‘elaborate, multi-stage screening
and evaluation process’ of Guanta´namo, as described by Johns, is in fact precisely
23 Ewald, supra note 18, at 199.
24 L. Amoore and M. de Goede, ‘Governing by Risk in theWar on Terror’, in L. Amoore and M. de Goede (eds.),
Risk and theWar on Terror (2008).
25 R. Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine (2006), 14.
26 F. Ewald, ‘The Return of Descartes’ Malicious Demon: An Outline of a Philosophy of Precaution’, in T. Baker
and J. Simon (eds.), Embracing Risk (2002), 294.
27 Foucault, supra note 1, at 65.
28 Ibid., at 63.
29 Agamben, supra note 9, at 39.
30 F. Johns, ‘Guanta´namo Bay and the Annihilation of Exception’, (2005) 16 EJIL 613, at 617.
31 J. Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (2004); D. Bigo, Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes:
The Insecurity Games (2006).
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mirrored by the risk practices of data mining, screening, algorithmic decision, and
scoring at multiple international borders.32 In a very real sense the transforma-
tions in ideas of state responsibility under international law are echoed by shifts
in public–private modes of risk management.33 The proliferation of risk norms as
modes of governing life, then, itself requires a complex and abundant programme
of legislation and legal intervention. Far from being an empty or anomic space, the
contemporary assemblage of law, risk, and norm abounds with the drawing of sov-
ereign lines, the designation of citizenship and degrees of citizenship – all of which
rely on amobile form of norm/anomaly in order to differentiate and discriminate.
In pre-emptive modes of risk management, though, and in contradiction to the
idea of anomic space, the norm governs in a speciﬁc way and with quite partic-
ular implications for law. For Ewald, the norm represents a ‘means of producing
the common standard, a rule for common judgement that makes law possible in
modern societies’.34 In the contemporary war on terror, meanwhile, we are seeing
the emergence of a more mobile form of norm than that which Ewald identiﬁes
with prudential or insurance-led modes of risk. In contrast to a common standard
or rule, the norm extends into domains of adjudicating on suspicions, identifying
anomaly, verifying the movements and transactions of the ordinary, and designat-
ing the threshold of the out of the ordinary. As Foucault explains with regard to
risk and the security apparatus, while disciplinary relations of law to norm ‘started
from a norm’ such that ‘the normal could be distinguished from the abnormal’,
we see instead ‘the plotting of the normal and the abnormal . . . the interplay of
differential normalities’.35 Thus, for example, in the advancement of risk scoring
and data mining of airline passengers and border-crossers, the common standard or
rule of immigration norms is overridden by amobile deployment of norm/anomaly
derived from associations made inside integrated databases. In this sense, it is not
strictly the norm that insinuates itself inside contemporary legal complexes, but
rather processes of differentiated normalization that always fall short of and exceed
the norm as common standard. Indeed, a key concern of legal activists seeking to
contest risk proﬁling is that the population targeted cannot know the norm against
which theywill be judged.36 Put simply, pre-emptive risk practices reserve the right
always to apply differential ‘common standards’, normalities, and anomalies.
32 SeeL.Amoore, ‘BiometricBorders:GoverningMobilities in theWaronTerror’, (2006)25 (3)PoliticalGeography
336;M. Salter, ‘Passports, Mobility and Security: How Smart Can the Border Be?’, (2004) 5 International Studies
Perspectives 69.
33 W.Werner, ‘Responding to the Undesired State Responsibility, Risk Management and Precaution’, (2005) 36
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 57.
34 Ewald, supra note 18, at 155.
35 Foucault, supra note 1, at 63.
36 Much of the legal advocacy work of organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the UK’s Liberty has coalesced around how citizens can know
which law, norm, or rule applies in public spaces. As subjects of newmodes of pre-emptive riskmanagement,
as Barry Steinhardt of the ACLU has it, ‘even the option to moderate or modify their behaviour is no longer
open, theycannotknowwhat is tobe judgedsuspiciousandscoredaccordingly’.Thedisciplinarydeployment
of norm, then, geared as it is to the governing of the self, appears here to be displaced by more mobile and
less visible modes of norm and anomaly.
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In summary, the intensiﬁed entanglement of law with risk practices that are
instituted by ‘experts’ in judging the mobile norm (from software corporations to
risk consultants) has exposed the difﬁculty for law to intervene on the grounds
of rights, justice, and common standards upon which it conventionally relies. The
fragile and mutable nature of such categories as rights to ‘a private life’ or ‘human
dignity’, in truth always present in legal struggles for recognition, are cast in sharp
relief by novel emerging complexes of law, risk, and norm.37 The discourse of rights
and justice – historically deployed both to extend and to contest legal–normal
complexes–nowﬁnds itself implicatedby itsproximity torisk, andyetalsouniquely
situated topriseopenspace forpublic engagement.What, then, are theprecise forms
and modalities taken by contemporary juridical complicity in, and contestation of,
risk practices?
3. EVIDENCE AND THE EXPERT WITNESS
In December 2006 a data-driven risk-screening programme, the ‘Automated Target-
ingSystem’ (ATS),deployedbyUSauthorities toscreenatall air, land,andseaborders,
became the subject of public and legal debate. Initially developed for the speciﬁc
purpose of assigning risk scores to cargo and container shipments into US ports of
entry, screening imported goods in advance of their arrival at theUS border, the ATS
had been exported in full to the risk management of people at the border. As the
Department of Homeland Security’s privacy impact assessment for ATS reveals, the
risk-based screening is thought to enable the ‘identiﬁcation of previously unknown
areas of note, concern or pattern’.38 ATS analyses an array of data on passengers
and border-crossers – including address, ﬁnancial records, ‘no show’ history, how
tickets were purchased, motor vehicle records, past instances of one-way travel, and
seating and meal preferences – in order to assign a risk score to individuals. The
score is used for a variety of purposes, including determiningwhether a person is to
be placed on a ‘selectee list’ for further scrutiny, stopped for additional questioning,
or, indeed, denied entry and deported. The risk-assessment calculation is classiﬁed
and the results may be kept on ﬁle for up to forty years.
ATS represents but one example of an emerging complex of law, risk, and norm
that is disturbing juridical conceptions of evidence and expert judgement, as well
as international legal conceptions of responsibility and accountability. In effect,
ATS deploys evidence before the fact and in advance of a future event that may or
may not come to pass. As the precautionary principlemigrates to security contexts,
civil liberties and human rights lawyers confront the problem of data deployed
as evidence of the unknown. Donald Rumsfeld’s by now infamous comments on
getting inside the ‘unknown unknowns’ led him to conclude that ‘the absence
of evidence is not evidence of absence’.39 It is precisely this assumption – that
37 C. Douzinas, ‘Identity, Recognition, Rights, or What Hegel Can Teach Us about Human Rights’, (2002) 29
Journal of Law and Society 379.
38 Department of Homeland Security, ‘Survey of DHS Data Mining Activities’, (2006), 9.
39 D. Rumsfeld, ‘Press conference byUS Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld’, NATO, Brussels, 6–7 June 2002,
available at www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020606g.htm (last visited April 2007).
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the threat of the unknown shifts the threshold of evidence – that has led legal
activists to challenge the supposition of suspicion. According to Barry Steinhardt
of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), ATS casts suspicion on millions of
innocent travellers,while seriously threateningprivacy and constitutional liberties.
Because the systemscreens entirepopulations in the search for ‘unknownterrorists’,
deploying a calculation that can never itself be made visible, people can never
meaningfully access, challenge, or correct their risk category. ‘Does the government
get to scrutinize every address at which you’ve ever lived?’, asks Steinhardt, ‘quiz
you about the fact that you once went 12 months without a job? About your web
surﬁng, your online book purchases, your school transcripts, your associations?’40
Similar concerns are raised by the senior counsel of EPIC, Melissa Ngo. ‘You can
never really know what is in this risk score, or how to get off a “watch list”’, she
argues; ‘citizens ask us this every day, will they ever tell you that you are or are not
on a list? It is now seven hundred thousand names’.41 For the EPIC lawyers ﬁling
complaints on ATS, the mobile and amorphous nature of the norm of evidence
deployed is a crucial problem:
The sharp departure after 9/11 was to move from individualised surveillance to mass
suspicion. In other words, governments always had tools to pursue individuals who
were considered to be criminals or terrorists, but the understanding was that those
investigations would be pursued based on targeted leads. The real erosion has been
around the legal frameworks – it is a movement away from a targeted approach to
establishing guilt, to a broad presumption that everyone may be a little bit guilty or a
little bit terrorist inclined. That is the signiﬁcance of the automated targeting system.
They runaseriesofquestions . . . it is averyodd thing for ademocratic country toassign
to people a probability of committing a terrorist act, even if it is a low probability.42
The rise of pre-emptive risk calculations as a means of identifying vulnerable
spacesandsuspiciouspopulations inthewaronterror, then,hasredeﬁnedbydegrees
the threshold of evidence required to make a security decision. Thus, for example,
as Marieke de Goede has argued, the threshold for the freezing of ﬁnancial assets
or the monitoring of ﬁnancial transactions is considered to be much lower than
that for other forms of detention, and yet such actions have similar effects in terms
of limiting life chances and withholding the means to a sustainable way of life.43
Likewise,BernardHarcourtsuggests that theracialproﬁlingofyoungMuslimmenin
theLondonUndergroundandtheNewYorksubway,whilstprohibited inestablished
juridicalmodels, is authorized innew formsby a supposition of suspicion in thewar
on terror. Citing Paul Sperry of Stanford’s Hoover Institution, Harcourt illustrates
howmodels of risk expertise from commercial contexts have come to be authorized
in and through law: ‘it makes no sense to search old ladies or children; the police
should target the high-risk population. Insurance companies proﬁle policyholders
40 B. Steinhardt, ‘The Automated Targeting System –AViolation of American Law, the US–EU PNRAgreement
and Basic Human Rights’, presented to European Parliament, Brussels, 27March 2007.
41 Interview with Melissa Ngo, Director of the Identiﬁcation and Surveillance Project, Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC),Washington, DC, 30 October 2007.
42 InterviewwithMarc Rotenberg, supra note 10.
43 M. de Goede, ‘The Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe’, (2008) 14 European Journal of
International Relations 161.
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based on probability of risk. That’s just smart business. Likewise, proﬁling subway
passengers based on proven security risk is just smart law enforcement’.44
Thediffusionof authority into a legal complex that incorporatesprivate commer-
cial expertise, aswell as the assumption of ‘smart security’, ismirrored also in ‘smart
borders’ programmes suchasATS.Assistant SecretaryofHomelandSecurity Stewart
Baker, speaking on the ATS programme, offers risk-based screening as an objective,
neutral, and expert-led system that means that ‘grandmothers and infants move
more quickly through security’, while others are screened in for a ‘closer look’.45 The
racial proﬁling and identity associations that are made inside the risk calculation
are, of course, concealed by the appeal to techno-science.46 The evidential basis for
the designation of norm and anomaly is link analysis, an algorithmic model that
looks for associations and ﬂags risk on the basis of the links between data. In this
way, pre-emptive risk screening makes the case for evidence deployed before the
fact:
This is a lesson we learned from September 11. After-the-fact reviews of the hijackers
travel reservations showed thatwemighthavebeenable touncover theplot ifwe’dhad
better computer systems and better access to travel data . . .We didn’t connect those
dots before 9/11, but we should have. We learned that lesson, and now ATS allows us
to look for these links.47
The connecting of dots celebrated by Baker is exactly the work of link analysis
deployed across integrated databases. The 9/11 commission documents are replete
with references to the need to ‘connect the dots’ in order to provide evidence before
the event. Indeed, private commercial models for connecting dots – such as those
developed by IBM, Microsoft, Oracle, Raytheon, and Accenture, and later deployed
inmajor contracts tomanageUS andUKborders –were reported by the commission
as ameans bywhich ‘the events of 9/11 could have been anticipated and prevented’.
The representation of evidence before the event as the solution to catastrophe risk
in the war on terror has cleared substantial space for expert models of calculation.
As Valverde and Rose note, in historical context ‘a plurality of different forms of
expertise have attached themselves to the institutions and procedures of the law’.48
At historical moments when law turns to expertise to authorize legal judgments
and decision, it reconsiders the basis of legal evidence. It becomes possible, then, for
expert risk managers to claim that the evidence for the events of 9/11 was already
present before the attack, indeed, that if their procedures and risk judgements were
44 B. Harcourt,Against Prediction: Proﬁling, Policing and Punishing in an Actuarial Age (2007), 228.
45 S. Baker, Remarks, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 19 December 2006 available
at www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1166557969765.shtm (last visited 8 October 2007).
46 It is the proﬁling and targeting potential of integrated databases that is of key concern, for example, to the
UK’s human rights group Liberty: ‘Of course once you get into individual proﬁling, what we mean in this
political and current environment that we’re speaking when we’re talking about proﬁling, we’re talking
about racial proﬁling. My concern is that eventually when they’ve sold these systems on, that there will be
the onlyplace there is to go’ (GarethCrossman, policy director and counsel, Liberty, interviewed2September
2007).
47 Baker, supra note 45.
48 Valverde and Rose, supra note 15, at 548.
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to be authorized in decisions to deport, detain, or intercept, future terrorist crimes
could be prevented.
If law is to prise open public space to contest the deployment of pre-emptive
evidence ‘before the fact’, then it must ﬁrst confront the contingency and perform-
ativity of all forms of evidence.49 In many ways there is nothing at all new in
the authorization of experts to judge criminality in advance or, as Foucault de-
picts twentieth-century medico-legal judgement, ‘expert opinion shows how the
individual resembles his crime before he has committed it’.50 To confront the con-
tingencyof legal categories is also toacknowledge law’s intrinsic role indetermining
‘theway inwhichwe see and are given to theworld to be seen’ –what Costas Douzi-
nas refers to as the ‘legal screen’.51 If the legal screen is interposed between theworld
of data, facts, and evidence and themaking of social, political, and legal judgements
and decisions, then pre-emptive evidence may itself be authenticated. Consider, by
way of example, the case for datamining and biometric identiﬁersmade byMichael
Chertoff to the European Parliament:
In June 2003, using PNR data and other analytics, one of our inspectors at Chicago’s
O’Hare airport pulled aside an individual for secondary inspection and questioning.
When the secondary ofﬁcers were not satisﬁed with his answers they took his ﬁn-
gerprints and denied him entry to the United States. The next time we saw those
ﬁngerprints – or at least parts of them – they were on the steering wheel of a suicide
vehicle that blew up and killed 132 people in Iraq.52
The spectacular nature of the presentation of evidence – its intricate staging and
performance– iswrit large inChertoff’s appeal tonew formsofﬁngerprint evidence.
The conventional scene of crime ﬁngerprint evidence, itself historically authorized
by science and expertise, is invoked here to authenticate the biometric used to
make a pre-emptive judgement at the border. Evidence at the threshold of unknown
futures, although prevalent in novel forms in contemporary security practice, is
actually authorized inways that are not dissimilar to the commonplace and prosaic
work of legal representations ofwhat counts as evidence.
4. DIGITIZED DISSECTION AND THE LEGAL SUBJECT
In 2005 the UK Home Ofﬁce and the US Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) began trials of new X-ray devices for the screening of bodies at border cross-
ings. Rapiscan System’s ‘Backscatter’ scanners appeared in Terminal 4 of London’s
Heathrowairport and inPhoenix’s SkyHarbor airport, producing screened imagesof
passenger’s naked bodies as they passed through security checkpoints. In the TSA’s
budget statement to Congress in 2007, special mention wasmade of the substantial
investment in ‘Whole Body Imaging’ or ‘Backscatter X-ray’, with a statement that
‘the technology produces an image to identify contraband secreted on an individual
49 See E. Morgan, ‘New Evidence: The Aesthetics of International Law’, (2005) 18 LJIL 163.
50 M. Foucault,Abnormal: Lectures at the Colle`ge de France 1974–1975, trans. G. Burchell (2003), 23.
51 C. Douzinas, ‘The Legality of the Image’, (2000) 63Modern Law Review 830.
52 M. Chertoff, ‘Remarks to European Parliament’s Committee on Justice, Civil Liberties and Home Affairs’, 15
May 2007.
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without subjecting them to an invasive inspection’. Proposed for use in allmajor US
and UK airports, as well as in the London Underground system in the form of milli-
metre wave technology, Backscatter mirrors and reﬂects the risk-based data mining
ofpre-emptiveborder controls. Ineffect, thepersonexperiencesadoubled fracturing
of their sense of identity – a digitized dissection made inside integrated databases
and then visualized projection at the border. So the fractured subject derived from
risk-based data mining arrives at the border before the person, who is then further
denuded by risk visualization technologies such as Backscatter.
The response to Backscatter by human rights and civil liberties lawyers has
centredonthequestionofrights toprivacyandhumandignity.EPIC’sseniorcounsel,
for example, has argued that Backscatter scans are ‘equivalent to a “virtual strip
search” for all air travellers’, and that the machines show ‘extraordinary disregard
for the privacy rights’ of passengers. The central critical juridical questions have
become how, or whether, images collected and seen on the screen can be made to
comply with data protection laws, and whether there is adequacy in the treatment
of data by public authorities:
They’re designed to capture images, and TSA made some very misleading statements
early on about how they were showing operators only chalk lines and all these other
ways to obscure the image, which basically has nothing to do with what’s being
recorded by the device. We pressed that issue with them and now they have given us
some assurances that they’re in fact not going to be saving these images but of course
the devices are intended, designed to save the images. Howwill they be used, bywhom,
with what safeguards to privacy?53
The claim to rights to privacy, bodily integrity, or human dignity, however, faces
particular difﬁculties in relation to risk technologies that dissect and fragment the
person into a series of risk factors. What happens to the legal subject when risk
visualizations – extending from imaging devices such as Backscatter to the screened
visual displays of risk scores – speciﬁcally divide and subclassify the body into
differential traits, characteristics, behaviours? What are the limits of the citizen’s
obligation to reveal the elements, the prosaic daily intimacy of their lives? As Engin
Isin has argued compellingly, the ‘neurotic citizen’, once reduced to a ‘species body’,
actively stripsherself downinorder to ‘calibrate itself’ to theanxieties anddangersof
the border.54 Thus, the very category of legal subject, or indeed of citizen, is exposed
in its full fragility. What happens to the body that cannot be veriﬁed, that does
not calibrate to the mobile norm, or is not recognized or is mis-recognized under
international law?
In the contestation of risk technologies such as Backscatter, then, the law once
more confronts the making of its own categories. If it recognizes only a ‘a non-
substantial, a thin personality, a public image that seriously mis-matches people’s
self-image’,55 then legal intervention risksmirroring the stripping-downanddenud-
ing strategies of the homeland security state itself:
53 Interviewwith Rotenberg, supra note 10.
54 E. Isin, ‘The Neurotic Citizen’, (2004) 8 Citizenship Studies 232.
55 Douzinas, supra note 37, at 397.
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Human rights break down the body into functions and parts and replace its unity
with rights . . . Encountering rights annihilates and dismembers the body: the right to
privacy isolates the genital area and creates a ‘zone of privacy’ around it; free speech
severs the mouth and protects its communicative but not its eating function, while
free movement does the same with legs and feet, but offers no right of abode.56
Put simply, the abstractions that are made in the defence of people’s rights to
privacy, just as in the digitized imaging of the body, risk recognizing only a facsimile
of a person. The reduction of a person to their rights recognizes, as Douzinas puts
it, only ‘the man of the rights of man’, who appears ‘without differentiation or
distinction inhisnakednessandsimplicity,unitedwithallothers inanemptynature
deprived of substantive characteristics’.57 Certainly the nakedness of the stripped-
down man in the rights of man is not recognized in its full political difﬁculty by
the continual redrawing of a legal boundary. It is this redrawing that runs through
most of the current legal appeals to privacy: ‘the infringement on privacy must be
proportionate to the security threat’; ‘the collection and use of personal data must
be transparent’; ‘subjects must be informed if they are on a no-ﬂy list’.58 Where
someone is left to make a claim for recognition based on corporeal difference – ‘I
am pregnant’; ‘I have a prosthetic limb’; ‘I have a mastectomy’ – they are rendered
invisible, slipping away from the juridical domain.
Douzinas does offer, though, one possible critical route thatmay be open to legal
intervention and responsibility: that is, to consider the appeal to rights of many
kinds – privacy, bodily integrity, a private family life, freedom of expression – to
be one speciﬁc struggle for recognition among many others, a speciﬁcally legal claim
to human identity that is, nonetheless, always already also political and social. In
practice, suchastruggle for recognition ispresent in theclaims, cases, andcampaigns
of critical lawyers seeking to challenge new risk technologies. As senior counsel
Lillie Coney explains in relation to recognizing ‘non-citizens’ in border control and
immigration issues,
The idea of the non-citizen. It’s very disturbing to me, because I work on civil rights
issues, that’s my background, that’s where I came from. And I’m doing a lot of work
to try to bring that community into these discussions along privacy, but a lot of the
discussions about non-citizens sound a lot like the discussion that occurred around
equal rights for women, equal rights for minorities, within the United States. It can’t
be deﬁned strictly as civil liberties because we were talking about people who are
non-citizens. But we do need to start having discussions about human rights and that
Americans can’t suspend their care of human rights if the person is a non-, is not a US
citizen.59
On theonehand, then, liberal formsof legal recognition restrict our ability to talk
back inthe faceofnon-recognition, strippingawaythespeciﬁcitiesof family, culture,
experience, race, and leavingonlywhatDouzinas describes as an ‘emptyunit’.60 And
56 Ibid., at 399.
57 Ibid., at 398.
58 EuropeanParliament, ‘Findings of theArticle 29Data ProtectionWorking Party of theEuropeanParliament’s
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs’, Brussels, 26 March 2007.
59 Interviewwith Lillie Coney, senior counsel and deputy director, EPIC,Washington, DC, 31 October 2007.
60 Douzinas, supra note 37, at 398.
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yet, in thestruggle for legal recognitionthere isanoscillationbackandforthbetween
claims to the universal, usually framed by ideas of ‘nation’, ‘international’, ‘citizen’,
even ‘homeland’, and the speciﬁcities of the particular that defy and expose these
categories. The legal ‘other’ is but one of the others in front of whom we seek to
be recognized. ‘The typical harm of defective recognition’, as depicted by Douzinas,
absolutely captures the multiple projected identities and mis-recognitions of risk
imaging and screening, where a split occurs ‘between someone’s self-image and
the image that social institutions or others project upon that person’. If law is to
intervene to contest this particular effect of its own suspension then it cannot avoid
the encounter with multiple struggles for recognition. As in Lillie Coney’s legal
advocacy for the non-recognized, non-American communities, the grounds for legal
personhoodmust also come into critical reappraisal. Rather than intervene to shore
up the completeness of legal personhood – via strict rights of privacy, dignity, and
bodily integrity – thiswould imply precisely the opposite, a questioning of howone
becomes a legal subject and how one reconciles the exclusions and exceptions that
make this possible.
As the assemblages of law and norm become ever more closely bound up with
risk practices thatmodel, pre-empt, and visualize, there is a double bind to confront
in the discourse of human rights. As Jacques Derrida put the problem in the week
following the events of 9/11,
We must more than ever stand on the side of human rights.We need human rights. We
are in need of them and they are in need, for there is always a lack, a shortfall, a falling
short, an insufﬁciency; human rights are never sufﬁcient. They are not natural, they
have a history – one that is recent, complex and unﬁnished’.61
The proliferation of risk practices that make no ethical decisions but only defer
decision into calculation must surely demand that we, as Derrida says, stand on
the side of human rights. But this necessarily juridical intervention in otherwise
denuded risk calculations can only proceed in full knowledge of its own historical
context and contingency. Always there will be new claims that have to work from
some sense of aunity fromwhich they are excluded, andyet always these claimswill
come from difference, from a failure of the legal ‘other’ to recognize that difference.
5. CONCLUSIONS: LAW AND PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT
The concept of pure hospitality can have no legal or political status. No state canwrite
it into its laws.62
I shall conclude by returning to the dilemmawith which I began – when European
law intervened to prohibit data transfer for risk scoring, but authorized themultiple
risk practices that are set to deﬁne the granting of visa waiver. Onemight say, as the
domain of crime and evidence of crime becomes indistinguishable from national
security actions, that juridical intervention can only act to redraw marginally the
61 J.Derrida, ‘Autoimmunity: Real andSymbolic Suicides’, inG. Borradori,Philosophy in aTime of Terror:Dialogues
with Ju¨rgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (2003), 132.
62 Ibid., at 129.
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lineofwhat is admissible,what constitutes adequateprotection.63 Perhaps to submit
to the deployment of risk screening and avert the prohibition of entire groups of
people from legal categories is the only choice that civil liberties or human rights
law canmeaningfully take. Theremay be, as I have suggested here, a new limit, now
more visible than before, placed upon the capacity of law to extricate itself from the
proliferation of discretionary norms and open public space for contestation. And
yet, could it be that the inextricable binding together of legal practicewithnon-legal
formsof expertise, thoughundeniably takingviolent formsandhavingmaterial and
barbaric effects on the life chances of people, also contains the potentiality for its
ownundoing?Although it is not the case that law is contesting its own suspension –
for, as I have suggested, it is by nomeans suspended – there are instances where it is
at least suspending reliance on conventional categories of rights and justice.
If law depends so readily on the mask of representational practices of ‘evidence’,
‘rights’, the ‘legal subject’, then its entanglement with risk technologies that pro-
foundly shake those categories is having material and political effects. Across the
different examples of legal contestation of risk technologies I have explored, there is
a struggle for recognition that somehow demands a personhood that is more than a
risk calculus, that exceeds the categories of safe and dangerous. In pressing the ques-
tions ofwhat counts as evidence,whodecides,who is the rightful legal subject,what
is the threshold for security decisions, law confronts the contingency and frailty of
its owngrounds for judgement. There is a distinctive ambiguity, then, in the relation
between justice and the possibilities for a transformative ethics of the recognition of
personhood. As William Connolly captures the ethico-political practices of public
engagement, there is potential ‘in a modern world of justice’ for suffering to move
from obscurity ‘below the register of justice’ to a visible ‘unmarked place on it’.64
Thus the ‘non-citizens’ unrecognized by strictly ‘civil’ liberties haunt the terrain of
rights and struggle for an unmarked place upon it. Can law foster a hospitality to
the unknown, the unexpected and unanticipated arrival of a legal subject whom it
does not recognize? Do the risk practices that categorize personhood at the horizon
of unknown futures encounter a limit in modes of law that respond differently to
the unknown subject?
63 E. Guild, ‘The Foreigner in the Security Continuum: Judicial Resistance in the United Kingdom’, in P. K.
Rajaram and C. Grundy-Warr (eds.), Borderscapes: Hidden Geographies at Territory’s Edge (2007).
64 W. Connolly,Why I AmNot a Secularist (1999), 63.
